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Background to the Kenya Cases
The current situation in Kenya rises out of a proprio motu 
investigation1 initiated by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the 
ICC in 2010 aimed at holding accountable the individuals believed 
to be responsible for crimes against humanity during the 2007-
2008 post-election violence, which killed over 1200 and displaced 
more than half of million individuals. After more than a year of 
legal wrangling and political pressure from the Kenyan government 
which challenged the admissibility of the cases before the Court 
on the basis of the principle of complementarity and requested 
unsuccessfully that the suspects be tried in a Kenyan court rather 
than in The Hague, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC confirmed 
charges against four individuals. One of those, the former head of 
civil service, Francis Muthaura, was released due to lack of evidence 
resulting from the withdrawal of key witnesses or their unwillingness 
to testify. For the other three— Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto, and 
Joshua Sang—the Court has decided to continue with the trial, albeit 
in a modified format to accommodate the requests of Kenyatta and 
Ruto not to be tried at the same time in line with the constitutional 
responsibilities of their offices.
Given the high profile of this case, the prosecution of Kenyatta and 
his deputy, Ruto, was always going to prove troublesome for the 
Court. However, it was not until the most recent 2013 presidential 
elections which saw Kenyatta and Ruto win the Presidency, that the 
real magnitude of the challenge lying before the ICC Prosecutor 
became evident. Kenyatta and Ruto assiduously used to their 
advantage what was perceived by many as an attempt by Western 
countries to interfere with the Kenyan elections and secured an 
electoral victory against the incumbent Prime Minister and a favourite 
of the West, Raila Odinga. Since then, Kenyatta and his deputy have 
done their best to appear as if they are cooperating with the Court, 
while at the same time using all judicial and diplomatic means to 
The African Union (AU), a union consisting of 54 African States, held an Extraordinary 
Summit on 11-12 October 2013, to discuss its 
relationship with the International Criminal Court 
(ICC or the Court). The meeting took place just 
weeks before the trial of Kenya’s President Uhuru 
Kenyatta is scheduled to begin, and was clearly 
intended to voice discontent and put on hold the 
ongoing ICC proceedings against Kenyatta as 
well as his deputy, Vice-President William Ruto. 
Before the Summit, there were even widespread 
rumors that the Assembly of the AU would call 
for a mass withdrawal of African States Parties 
from the ICC Statute. Eventually, the Assembly did 
not go that far and took two important, but less 
controversial decisions. It called for the granting of 
immunities to Heads of States from prosecutions 
by international criminal tribunals and requested a 
deferral of the ICC cases against Kenyatta and Ruto 
through a resolution adopted by the UN Security 
Council (UNSC). After providing a background to 
the Kenya cases, this policy brief aims to evaluate 
what the position of the EU and its Member States 
as outspoken supporters of the ICC and the fight 
against impunity should be, especially given the 
fact that France and the UK, as permanent UNSC 
members, could block a UNSC deferral at any time. 
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avoid their presence in the courtrooms in The Hague and to grind 
the cases against them to a halt. They have both argued that they 
cannot attend trials in The Hague and effectively run a country at 
the same time. 
Furthermore, the terrorist attacks in Nairobi by al-Shabaab 
have put the need for stability and order in Kenya under the 
international community’s microscope and seemed to have had 
the effect of bolstering the argument of Kenyatta and Ruto.2
Judicial Means Used By Ruto and Kenyatta to Avoid 
Continuous Presence in The Hague 
For the time being, both Kenyatta as well as Ruto have been 
able to carry out their official duties, while also appearing in 
The Hague when asked by the Court to do so. However, both the 
Defense of Ruto and Kenyatta have filed judicial submissions to 
avoid presence in The Hague.
Firstly, both Ruto’s and Kenyatta’s defense team lodged a request 
to be excused from being physically present continuously 
throughout the trial. In two decisions, issued on 18 June and 
18 October 2013, the competent Trial Chambers in the Ruto 
and Kenyatta cases conditionally granted Ruto’s and Kenyatta’s 
request to be excused from being physically present continuously 
throughout the trial, with the exception of a number of sessions 
such as: the opening and closing statements of all parties and 
participants; when victims present their views and concerns in 
person during the trial; the delivery of judgment in the case and, 
if applicable, sentencing and reparations.3  The Trial Chambers 
stated that the decisions were taken purely as a matter of 
reasonable accommodation of the demanding functions of 
President and Vice-President.⁴  Moreover, for the Trial Chamber 
in the Kenyatta case, the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall 
highlighted why it was important to balance the requirement of 
an accused being present in Court with the functions of State 
that Kenyatta as President would be required to perform.⁵ 
The ICC Prosecutor filed its appeal against the decision in the 
Ruto case on 29 July 2013. On 25 October 2013, in a unanimous 
decision, the Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the 
Trial Chamber and held that Ruto is required to continuously 
attend his trial, with exceptions to be granted only in exceptional 
circumstances.⁶  The decision is limited to Ruto, but its legal 
findings clearly apply to Kenyatta as well. From a legal 
perspective, the decision of the Appeals Chamber seems correct. 
Article 63(1), the provision in the ICC Statute dealing with the 
presence of the accused, is clear: “the accused shall be present 
during the trial”.⁷ 
From a policy perspective, the Decision of the Appeals Chamber 
is probably less to be welcomed, because it will probably ensure 
that Ruto and Kenyatta will stop cooperating with the Court 
and will step up their efforts to bring the cases diplomatically 
to a halt. If Ruto and Kenyatta actually cease to cooperate with 
the Court, the ICC Prosecutor will most probably request the 
ICC Trial Chambers to issue an arrest warrant to ensure their 
presence at trial.
The AU Extraordinary Summit and Its Outcome
Indeed, apart from exhausting all possible judicial means, Ruto 
and Kenyatta, as an alternative, used all diplomatic efforts to 
bring the cases against them to a halt. At the initiative of Kenya’s 
Foreign Minister Amina Mohammed and masterminded by 
Uganda’s President Museveni⁸, the AU convened an Extraordinary 
Summit on 11 and 12 October 2013, officially entitled “Africa’s 
relationship with the International Criminal Court”. It is clear 
however from the Declarations and Decisions adopted during 
the Extraordinary Summit that its main purpose was to find a 
way to stall the ICC proceedings against Ruto and Kenyatta. 
Before the Summit, there were even widespread rumours that the 
Assembly of the AU would call for a mass withdrawal of African 
States Parties from the ICC Statute. Eventually, the AU Assembly 
took two less controversial Decisions. 
Firstly, the Assembly decided that “no charges shall be 
commenced or continued before any International Court or 
Tribunal against any serving AU Head of State or Government 
or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during their 
term of office”⁹  and “that African States Parties propose relevant 
amendments to the Rome Statute, in accordance with Article 121 
of the Statute”.1⁰ 
Secondly, the Assembly decided “(t)hat Kenya should send a 
letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting for 
deferral, in conformity with Article 16 of the Rome Statute, of 
the proceedings against the President and Deputy President of 
Kenya that would be endorsed by all African States Parties”.11 
What Should the EU Position be towards the AU Extraordinary 
Summit Decisions?
The full-time presence of Kenyatta and Ruto in The Hague, be 
it because they both decide despite everything to comply with 
the Appeals Chambers ruling, or, otherwise, should the ICC 
Prosecutor in fact be able to secure it through an arrest warrant, 
is likely to cause chaos and instability in Kenya. Following the 
Westgate terrorist attacks, the situation in the country is already 
tense and there are indications that al-Shabaab is preparing to 
strike again. Moreover, the inconsistency of the EU and its Member 
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States in the run-up to, and following the Presidential elections has 
made it difficult for them to be perceived as unbiased.12 
Such are the stakes. The question then becomes, what can be 
done to demine the situation, while at the same time ensure that 
justice will not be denied to the victims of the 2007-2008 post 
electoral violence? More in particular, what should the position of 
the EU and its Member States as outspoken supporters of the ICC 
and the fight against impunity be towards the Decisions adopted 
at the AU Extraordinary Summit? Determining the EU Position 
towards the AU’s stance on ICC matters is essential. Indeed, it is 
no wonder that the ICC is sometimes dubbed as the “European 
Court of African Affairs”.13  
The EU and its Member States have from the outset been rhetorical, 
diplomatic and financial supporters of a Court that has, until now, 
only prosecuted crimes that occurred on the African continent. 
In this particular case, the EU and its Member States are key 
players, given the fact that France and the UK, as permanent UNSC 
members, could block a UNSC deferral at any time. 
Recommendations
We urge the EU and its Member States to pursue a two-pronged 
strategy, which guarantees the Court’s legitimacy and functionality 
while obviating any concerns of instability or violence in Kenya.
a. Strongly Reject Call for Immunities for Heads of States, But 
Support A One Year Article 16 Deferral By The UNSC
Firstly, the EU and its Member States should strongly reject the AU 
Assembly proposal to grant immunities to sitting Heads of States 
from prosecution by international criminal tribunals. Supporting 
such a proposal would be entirely contradictory with the EU and 
its Member States’ commitment to the fight against impunity for 
international crimes, crimes which are very often orchestrated by 
people in positions of power such as Heads of States. Furthermore, 
by virtue of Article 27 of the ICC Statute, all African States Parties 
to the ICC Statute, including Kenya, have consensually accepted 
the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute Heads of State. If African 
States Parties table a proposal for amendment of Article 27 during 
the upcoming Assembly of States Parties of the ICC at the end 
of November, EU States Parties should take concerted action and 
unequivocally renounce the proposal.
Second, the EU and its Member States should support the AU 
Assembly proposal for a UNSC Resolution under Article 16 of 
the ICC Statute, deferring the current trial of Kenyatta and Ruto 
for one year, subject to renewal, as foreseen in Article 16. This 
should allow Kenyatta and Ruto to play an important role in facing 
the security threats in Kenya and in the East African region more 
broadly. Indeed, the whole quandary surrounding the Kenyatta 
and Ruto cases is precisely what Article 16 aims to address. Article 
16 is the acknowledgement of the fact that a dilemma can exist 
between peace and justice, by allowing the UNSC to defer ICC 
investigations and prosecutions when they compromise on the 
maintenance of international peace and security.1⁴   We are aware 
that the involvement of the UNSC in what should be a strictly 
judicial process is one that the EU and its Member States would 
have rather done without. But the case before the Court is no 
longer a strictly judicial one and in any case, the preservation of the 
Court’s legitimacy and functionality would more than compensate 
for such involvement. An Article 16 deferral would furthermore 
have the benefit of using an instrument foreseen in the ICC Statute 
and would provide a political solution to what has become a 
political question. For Kenyatta and Ruto, the decision will provide 
some breathing space, although it will not give them what they 
ultimately want, i.e. a dismissal of their cases. Meanwhile, the 
victims, their representatives, and the OTP will take comfort in the 
thought that Kenyatta and Ruto are on borrowed time, and that 
they may yet be held accountable for the alleged crimes they are 
suspected to have committed. It is often said that “justice delayed 
is justice denied” but it is also true that justice can be patient. 
Since other trials related to the 2007-2008 post electoral violence 
will still go forward, an Article 16 deferral should be seen simply 
as a tactical withdrawal which will not ultimately affect the overall 
strategic gains made by the EU and its Member States in their fight 
against impunity.
b. Stepping Up Diplomatic Pressure To Ensure Africa’s 
Commitment to the Court
The ICC-Africa relationship has been deteriorating in the last 
couple of months, and it seems like things will only get worse 
in the near future. Indeed, the Decision of the Appeals Chamber, 
requiring Ruto to continuously attend his trial, will likely upset 
the AU. Moreover, there is a rather slim chance that the requests 
formulated in the AU Summit Decisions will be met, in case 
which AU members indicated that they would convene another 
Extraordinary Summit in November. It is anticipated that AU 
Member States, particularly those with strong sentiment against 
ICC, would escalate their mobilisation against ICC. This may 
result in the adoption of far-reaching decisions, which may at 
that point include withdrawal, albeit even then it would not be 
mass withdrawal.1⁵  To prevent this from happening, the EU and 
its Member States should step up diplomatic pressure to ensure 
Africa’s commitment to the Court. After all, the EU’s own 2011 
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Action Plan on the ICC counts universality and integrity of the 
Rome Statute and cooperation with the ICC, among its main 
foci.1⁶
The EU and its Member States have the necessary tools at their 
disposal. Next spring, the EU and AU delegations will meet in 
Addis Ababa for their fourth AU-EU Summit. The purpose of 
the summit is to enhance economic and political cooperation 
between Europe and Africa, focusing in particular on “peace and 
security, democratic and economic governance and respect for 
human rights” as prerequisites of development.1⁷ The EU could 
remind its African partners that interference with the ICC, or 
worse, a withdrawal from the ICC Statute, would have an adverse 
impact on the success of the negotiations, since weakening the 
Court would run counter to the premise of the Summit itself. 
Moreover, EU officials should remind them that the Cotonou 
agreement, which, among others, regulates the EU’s relations 
with African countries, explicitly references the mainstreaming 
of the ICC Statute provisions regarding cooperation in all of the 
EU’s economic and diplomatic dealings with AU member states.1⁸
 
Conclusion
It is clear that the current situation offers no easy solutions. 
Neither of the alternatives before us—continuing prosecution 
of Kenyatta and Ruto or the withdrawal of African States from 
the ICC—are savoury ones. Both will lead to the weakening of 
the Court as an institution and diminish it as an instrument 
against impunity. That is why in our opinion the best alternative 
is a combination of a UNSC deferral under Article 16 of the ICC 
Statute combined with a diplomatic push from the EU and its 
Member States to remind the African States of their obligations 
as ICC States Parties. 
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